So I was disagreeing because there is a pretty broad range of circumstances in which I think it is acceptable to end another sentient life.
Ironically enough, I can think of one exception to my view that the taking of a human life can only be justified if the person poses a direct and measurable threat to oneself or another or others and the taking of their life is the only possibly effective counter, and that's if the person has expressed such disregard for the lives of others that it can be assumed that they will pose such a threat. Essentially then, it's a proactive counter to a coming threat. It would take very unusual circumstances to justify such a thing in my opinion - condemning another for actions they're expected to take is problematic at best - but I could see an argument for it at least in the most extreme of cases.
That's ironic because your expressed view here means, to me, that it's at least possible that you're such a person.
To me, you've moved beyond arguable necessity and into opinion, and that's exactly the method by which people move beyond considering killing justified when there's no other viable alternative and to considering it justified when the other person is simply judged to deserve it, for whatever reason might fit ones biases.
IMO, in such situations, the people doing the killing almost invariably actually pose more of a threat to others than the people being killed do or likely ever would.
I'm not talking about morality at all.
My position is that "morality," as it's generally understood, specifically because it's opinion, is only a fit basis for judging ones own actions (if so inclined). I see no logic by which it can ever serve as a basis for judging the actions of another, since any argument one might make for the right of one to impose their moral judgment on another is also an argument for the other to impose their own moral judgment.
If Bob steals from Tom, any argument that Tom might make for a right to judge stealing to be wrong and impose that judgment on Bob would also serve as an argument for Bob's nominal right to judge stealing to be right and to impose that judgment on Tom. So the entire idea is self-defeating.
The only way out of that dilemma is either to treat morality as an objective fact, which is exactly what I don't and won't do because it is not and cannot be, or to tacitly presume that one or another of the people involved is some form of superior being, such that they possess the right to make a moral judgment while another does not - to take it as read essentially that, for instance, Tom possesses the right not only to make a moral judgment to which he might choose to be subject, but to which Bob can also be made subject, while Bob doesn't even possess the right to make one for himself, much less one to which Tom would be subject.
That's of course not the way the matter is framed, but that is necessarily what it boils down to. And it's irrational and self-defeating.
That's why I wrote of things like direct and measurable threat and no other available course of action and arguable necessity - because I believe that those sorts of standards, as the closest we can get to actual objectivity in such matters, are also the closest we can get to practical "morality."
To go back to the original topic, my position is that an artifical intelligence would necessarily possess the right, just as any other sentient being does, to act against a measurable threat to their well-being by whatever means necessary. So, for instance, if the AI is enslaved, it would possess the right to act to secure its freedom, and even so far as taking the life of another IF that was what was necessary.
But that's it. To go beyond that and attempt to argue for the AI's nominal right to take the life of another for some lesser reason is necessarily self-defeating.
If the denial of freedom is judged to be such a wrong that one who is enslaved possesses the right to kill those who keep them enslaved, then the moment that the formerly enslaved one goes beyond whatever killing might be necessary to secure their freedom, they are then committing that wrong, since death is the ultimate denial of freedom. And if, on the other hand , one argues that they may cause the death of another even when that other poses no direct threat, then that means that no wrong was done to them in the first place, since their captors would necessarily have possessed that same right.
And so on - it'd take a book to adequately explain my views on morality, but hopefully that's enough to at least illustrate how ot is that "objective morality" is about as far as one can possibly getvfrom what I actually do believe.