CosmicGiraffe

#\s+ is:

• #: a literal #

• \s: any whitespace character (space, tab etc)

• +: the previous thing (here the whitespace), one or more times

In words: "a hash followed by at least one whitespace character"

#[^\s]. is:

• #: a literal #

• [^\s] : a negated character class. This matches anything other than the set of characters after the ^. \s has the same meaning as before, any whitespace character

• . : matches any single character

In words: "a hash followed by any character other than a whitespace character, then any character".

https://regex101.com/ is really good for explaining regex

I think this is maybe best expressed as pmOS development being controlled by the community, rather than a single organisation. I'd much rather use an OS where I have confidence that the developers are acting in the users best interest, rather than their employers best interest.

My opinion is that forks/downstreams of giant codebases like AOSP are largely going to have to accept choices made by the upstream. They can maybe pick and chose a few points where they maintain local patches, but that takes a lot of effort.

As an example, I think most chromium-based browsers will end up dropping support for uBlock Origin because Google dropped it upstream. That's the kind of choice they [edit: i.e. google] can make in their own self-interest by virtue of controlling the project, and the reason I'd prefer to use community-developed software.

Yeah, its not unreasonable that you'd have a remote way to access the device to gather debug data with the customers consent. An SSH key in the firmware is a flexible way to do that, so long as there are good controls in place to ensure that it isn't misused.

I think multiple people already have access to the databases that store the data the device sends. I don't really care whether they get the data from the device itself or from the database.

Similarly, I think multiple people have the ability to make changes to the firmware build and the systems that distribute it. So those people already have the potential ability to gain access to the device.

One person or multiple people having unauthorised access are both unacceptable. I'm saying that the users have to trust the companies ability to prevent that occurring, and that therefore this particular technical detail is mostly irrelevant

I'm 90% sure it is not a single user. I just don't see how that really affects the security of the product, given that the company that sells it can already do the things the author is saying can be done if you have this key.

To be clear, I wouldn't buy this. I just don't think the SSH key makes it any worse than it already was

A shared account doesn't mean everyone who works there has access to it, or that those who do have access aren't subject to some type of access control.

The article basically goes on to say that the existence of this key makes a huge difference to the security/privacy of the product. It argues that using it, someone could access data from the device, or use it to upload arbitrary code to the device for it to run. However, those are both things the user is already trusting the company with. They have to trust that the company has access controls/policies to prevent individual rogue employees doing the things described. It seems unreasonable to say that an SSH key being on the device demonstrates that those controls aren't in place.

The email address attached to the public key, [email protected], to me suggests the private key is likely accessible to the entire engineering team.

This assumption is doing a lot of heavy lifting in the authors argument that this is a big deal.

Sure, but then you've just shifted the problem up a level. Now I have to trust that the user id you provide me in the insecure channel really is you. Which means either trusting the insecure channel or trusting that the web app has confirmed who you are in some other way before giving you an ID.

We have to reject the first since we could skip all the asymmetric crypt and just send a symmetric key directly in the insecure channel.

If we're trusting the web app has confirmed your identity, we've moved from "just quickly go to this page and it'll generate you a public key" to "go to this site, upload a photo of your ID and a video of you saying that its you and whatever other verification is needed, then it'll give you a public key".

You originally wrote:

The one sticking point is that your recipient needs to visit the site before you can send your vacation photos to them, but is it really that hard?

The hard part isn't them going to the site in advance, it's them establishing trust with the site that they are who they claim to be.

Even if you're using asymmetric cryptography, you still have to trust the insecure channel. If an attacker can replace the URL sent there with their own then they can have the sender encrypt the files with an attacker controlled public key rather than the legitimate one

Here's an Olympic sprinter powering a toaster. He generates 0.021kWh going flat out: https://youtu.be/S4O5voOCqAQ

It's not that you change the passwords for each website often, it's that you use a different password for each site. That way if one site gets hacked and your password is leaked, it can't be used to access your accounts on other sites.

If you have a nut allergy you probably have never tasted nuts and wouldn't know that was what you were tasting