The pursuit of net zero has relied on Uighur Muslims forced to work in appalling conditions. Experts say Britain should follow other countries and take tougher stance.
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Many of the Chinese workers who are helping us to go green do not want to be at those factories. They do not arrive at work to manually crush silicon and load it into blazing furnaces because of a love of renewables, much less to earn a decent wage.
They are there as part of a mass forced labour programme by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that critics describe as a genocide. A reliance on men and women from the Uighur Muslim minority living in detention centres has helped the Xinjiang region to become the epicentre of the solar industry over the last 15 years.
At its peak, analysts believe that 95 per cent of the world’s solar modules were potentially tainted by forced labour in the region [of Xinjiang, in northwestern China]. This reliance on products partly made through working conditions that would be unfathomable in modern Britain represents what the Conservative MP Alicia Kearns calls an ethical “blind spot”.
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It is not only solar panels that are linked to widespread human rights abuses in the so-called Xinjiang Uighur autonomous region. Fuelled by an abundance of cheap, coal-driven electricity, the region produces vast amounts of everything from cotton to the lithium batteries that are ever more essential to our tech-driven lives.
But as governments across the world invest in solar energy in the race to reach net zero, experts have described a critical opportunity to curtail what has been one of Xinjiang’s champion industries.
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Alan Crawford, a chemical engineer who authored a 2023 report that exposed several companies with ties to forced labour, said that transparency from Chinese producers had decreased as a result. “Transparency has gotten worse because the Chinese know that people like us are looking,” he said.
While the Chinese authorities maintain that the Uighur community is free, images of internment camps have shown razor-wire fences manned by police. Leaked police files revealed a shoot-to-kill policy for escapers.
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The pervasiveness of forced labour across the early stages of the production process makes it difficult to find polysilicon from Xinjiang that has not been contaminated by forced labour. Hoshine Silicon, the dominant MGS producer in Xinjiang and a major supplier to the region’s polysilicon producers, has engaged in “surplus labour” programmes at its factories.
One propaganda account from 2018 details how a married couple were engaged in a “poverty alleviation” scheme in which they were moved 30 miles from their home in the rural Dikan township to work at a Hoshine factory in Shanshan county, leaving behind their children. The couple were described as being “relieved” of their worries by transferring their seven-acre grape farm to the state.
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[Laura] Murphy, a senior associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, said legislation introduced in the US in 2021 showed how supply chains can be cleaned up. The Uighur Forced Labour Prevention Act, which bans the import of goods linked to the region, has led to thousands of solar panel shipments being stopped by US customs.
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It is for this reason that Murphy believes the UK should mirror the US approach, a strategy already being pursued by the European Union. If the UK’s controls against forced labour are not robust, there is a high probability that the UK will simply become a “dumping ground” for the tainted goods not wanted by the US.
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Andrew Yeh, executive director of the China Strategic Risks Institute, said relying too heavily on China for solar energy products could also leave Britain vulnerable in a geopolitical crisis.
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For Murphy, legislation is the only meaningful response to the issue. [...] She said: “Whatever it is that other countries think they might be doing to discourage it, shy of legislation, shy of enforcement, it is not working.
“We can be morally outraged all we want and we can express our desires not to have forced labour-made goods, even at governmental level. But until we actually put it in law and enforce it, companies will continue to import goods made with forced labour into the UK.”
I personally feel that this speech doesn't address many issues regarding the CBDC. The most obvious imho is that ths is not a competition between the digital euro and private payment systems, nor is it an issue of digital euro versus stablecoins, as the speech appears to address.
The most pressing problem with stablecoins allegedly is a lack of transparency and regulation (what Mr. Lane suggests), as no none knows whether or not the provider maintains full reserves (Tether, a stablecoin with links to China that has reportedly also been used in Chinese-Russian trade to circumvent Swift sanction imposed by the West, has reportedly been failing in the past to present audits showing sufficient asset reserves). I agree that stablecoins appear to be a problem from this point of view (partly also because it may negatively effect commercial banking and credit business, as the speech also suggests), but I would not only focus on stablecoins when it comes to alternatives to our modern money.
"An evolutionary process towards a flexible but stable monetary system", to quote the speech, must not only entail the digitization of our fiat money, but the creation of a wide range of private currencies that are about to complement -rather than substitute- the future currency universe. Mr. Lane addresses this briefly in his speech, but then appears to offer 'only' CBDC as a solution. What we needed, however, are complementary currencies for different use cases. The digital euro is important, but only one part of the solution imho.
Private payment systems can (and should, imo) only be addressed by other private service companies. If we want an alternative for Paypal in Europe, we need something like Wero or the GNU Taler. It depends on the use case.
One major point with the digital euro is privacy. As for now, the planned so-called 'offline digital euro' -supposed to be used for very small everyday payments, e.g., you would bump your phone wallet to pay your restaurant bill, or you may even have a prepaid card rather than a phone- might be really private (to the best of my knowledge, interpreting the current plans). If you are using this offline version, the only people who have access to the payment data are you and the person/organization you pay. All checks are made only if you top up your digital wallet with your bank. (There is, however, a plan to combat criminal attempts and fraud, so it is not clear yet whether or not there will be a way for commercial banks -or the central bank- to use private data for this as the plans are not yet clear about it, afaik).
The online version of the digital euro is much trickier when it comes to privacy. According to the current plans, only your bank would see your full data (namely your transactional data and your identity), while the central bank would see your transactional data, but not your identity. However, such 'pseudonymity' is a much greater problem as it initially may seem as we know. First, a single transaction that would link your account to your identity could reveal immediately the entire data set; and, second, any change in the law -for example, a new government may hold a different view on privacy and introduces new rules- could undermine the privacy of people completely.
As Mr. Lane concludes,
Although I agree with this view in principle, controlling Europe's monetary and financial destiny is not about the digital euro alone. We need also private, complementary currencies as well as European alternatives to the private payment service providers currently dominated by U.S. companies.