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Tensions with the United States are rising as Europe draws up plans to spend hundreds of billions of euros on defence. EU leaders say the bloc must prepare to rely less on American military support, but Washington has warned against shutting US arms makers out of future contracts. Analysts say Europe still faces major hurdles if it wants to defend itself without US support.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on Friday said trade disputes must not be allowed to interfere with defence cooperation.

"I think these two are really separate. We should keep them separate, and should not let them to interfere in our discussions," Rutte said after a meeting of NATO foreign ministers.

His comments come as the European Union considers cutting back on non-EU participation in weapons tenders – a move that could sideline US and UK firms.

Last month, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told the foreign ministers of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that the United States “wants to continue participating in EU countries’ defence procurements”, but warned that any exclusion of US companies would be seen “negatively” by Washington.

The shift comes against a backdrop of increasing uncertainty about America’s long-term commitment to European security.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly accused European countries of “freeriding” on American military protection. He has said the continent should defend itself or at least contribute far more than it does now.

In mid-March, the European Commission proposed a €800 billion spending plan under the “**Rearm Europe” initiative, aimed at funding joint procurement and preparing for a future with less US involvement.

To understand what Europe would need to defend itself without US backing, RFI’s Jan van der Made spoke with Dr Alexandr Burilkov of Leuphana University in Lüneburg, Germany.

He co-authored a report on the subject, Defending Europe without the US, published by the Bruegel think tank and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

RFI: What could happen if the US is shut out of EU arms tenders?

Alexandr Burilkov: if the Trump administration sees it negatively, this will have political and economic consequences, probably with further tariffs and further economic policies targeted at the European Union.

How do we turn this €800 billion at EU level into procurement orders and then turn these orders into concrete military capabilities? You can print all the euros you want. You cannot print tanks, shells and aircraft.

It is a challenge because the European defence industrial base has been substantially hollowed out by the long peace dividend following the end of the Cold War, and finding ways to produce at scale what Europe needs in say, five years, is going to be relatively difficult without reaching outside of the bloc.

There are perhaps less controversial partners, such as South Korea. But many of the components that go into the weapons systems themselves are still dependent on the US. Scaling up European defence capabilities without purchasing American equipment is going to be very difficult.

RFI: Most of France's heavy duty weaponry, such as tanks, fighter jets, submarines, are locally produced. Germany with Rheinmetall and other large industrial groups is the same. So what US weaponry are we looking at here?

Alexandr Burilkov: France is the outlier in Europe because it is very much self-reliant. The Rafale [fighter jet] uses a couple of American components, but these could be made locally.

But France cannot supply all of Europe, especially not for land warfare capabilities. Other European weapon systems and industrial bases rely much more on the US.

For instance, the Eurofighter is about 25 percent American in components. The Swedish Gripen is almost 40 percent, including the engines. When it comes to air defence, the only real game in town for strategic air defence is either the French SAMPT or the American Patriot air defence system. And if one wants to procure strategic air defence at scale, including the missiles, it is very difficult to do so without the Patriot.

And there is the political question of whether all member states see it this way. Will it be something that all member states can agree on? Poland is supposed to take a very central role in European defence. But the Poles don’t have the same compunctions about buying American as others.

RFI: US military support to Ukraine amounted to €64 billion since the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. That's just over €2 billion more than what the EU spent. In your report, you say that if the EU were to compensate for US stopping aid, it would cost EU member states 0.12 percent of their GDP. How can they do that without access to the US military industrial base?

Alexandr Burilkov: Replacing the US defence industrial base is one challenge. Replacing very high-end American strategic satellites, which have played such a fundamental role in the war, is another. Europe does have some capabilities, but not to the scale that the US does. It is replaceable, but not necessarily in the short term.

RFI: Earlier this week Russia said that it's holding another round of drafting soldiers. It needed 160,000 more soldiers. In many EU countries, conscription is either abolished or suspended. Among people of 18 years and older, there is not much of a mindset that they could go into war. How much of a problem is that and how could that be tackled?

Alexandr Burilkov: Russian conscription is a regular event since 1991 and conscripts are not deployed outside of Russia, so they have been fighting in Kursk, they have not really been fighting in Ukraine. The only noteworthy thing about this spring conscription cycle is that the target has been raised from 135,000.

The Russian military doesn't fully rely on conscripts, who only make up about 20 percent of Russian soldiers.

When it comes to Europe, conscripts can play a role in generating enough soldiers to have the mass that is necessary in the event of a large conflict and to replace losses. But a better use for conscripts is to train enough people that can go into a pool of reservists for emergencies.

The nature of modern conflict really shows that a reliance on professional troops is highly preferable. And conscription, especially if the training period is too short – so anything less than a year – would just lead to disproportionate casualties.

So it's really incumbent on European governments and militaries to find ways to encourage professional soldiers, because these are more effective and would lead to fewer casualties in any kind of conflict scenario.

RFI: How do you see plans, often cited by French President Emmanuel Macron, to create a common European defence union and how does the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy play a role in that?

Alexandr Burilkov: An agreement on European common security and defence and any movement towards a European army is politically very difficult, but these are still encouraging steps.

What makes the US and Russia so effective as a military power is that they have a single command and control structure.

One of the reasons why Europe, despite having a collective military larger than the Russians, is less effective militarily is because of the lack of that. So any kind of movement towards creating mechanisms for joint command and control at the European level is obviously extremely welcome.