this post was submitted on 18 Nov 2026
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From latest Bazzite release

ujust check-anticheat

Epic has announced that it’s bringing Fortnite to Linux and rebuilding its anti-cheat as Easy Anti-Cheat Linux v2 with Fortnite as the first pilot before it opens up to other developers.

EAC has supported Linux for years, but many games never opted in because the Linux version couldn’t offer the same protection as the Windows one. To close that gap, v2 will require a set of security features Linux already has: a signed kernel and modules, TPM 2.0, Secure Boot and measured boot, IOMMU, kernel lockdown in integrity mode, kexec disabled, and BPF LSM.

Here is the kicker:

They were kind enough to make us one of the accepted well-known signing keys.

So its a whitelist system for kernel level anticheat.

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[–] gwheel@lemmy.zip 40 points 1 day ago (2 children)

I'm pretty sure bazzite is the well-known signer in this context. They aren't giving EAC kernel level access to bazzite, EAC is trusting that kernels signed by the bazzite team don't contain cheats.

[–] Lojcs@piefed.social 3 points 1 day ago (1 children)

Isn't running a bpf essentially the same?

[–] gwheel@lemmy.zip 3 points 1 day ago

The LSM BPF does sound bad, but I don't have my head fully wrapped around what it means or is capable of yet. My point is that this bazzite update is not describing a 'whitelist system for kernel level anticheat'. It doesn't sound like bazzite is making any change other than adding a status checker for things bazzite always supported.

[–] bjoern_tantau@swg-empire.de 6 points 1 day ago (1 children)

Yeah, most of the requirements should be default security practices anyways. I like that we now have a reason to make secure boot and TPM work properly out of the box.

[–] TwilightKiddy@scribe.disroot.org 4 points 14 hours ago

TPM is a joke of a security device and I would like to keep using secure boot with my own certificates, not the ones some unknown actors generate that could very well use just "4" as a private key. But that never happens, right?