Finance

Archived

[...]

China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is now mired in a mounting debt crisis, threatening the foundations of Beijing’s flagship global strategy. Infrastructure projects across Southeast Asia and Africa, financed by Chinese capital, are struggling even to meet interest payments, pushing China’s outstanding overseas debt past $1 trillion. Experts warn that if China’s loan-based diplomacy falters alongside the United States’ retreat from international aid, the global development finance system could face systemic disruption.

[...]

Launched in 2013 under President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative sought to build a “New Silk Road” through highways, railways, ports, dams, and power plants across the developing world. More than 140 countries across Asia, Europe, and Africa have joined. In its early phase, China—through institutions like the CDB—was seen as a generous financier, offering loans without stringent conditions on governance or human rights. Yet uncontrolled lending has since fueled debt explosions in many nations, reviving allegations of Beijing’s “debt-trap diplomacy.”

Developing nations now owe China at least $1.1 trillion in outstanding obligations. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway have become symbols of unsustainable debt and opaque lease agreements, while Zambia and Ghana both defaulted in 2020. Twelve African nations, including Kenya, are currently facing similar debt distress. Kenya’s so-called “Railway to Nowhere”—abandoned mid-construction in a cornfield after Chinese funding dried up—has come to epitomize the perils of overreliance on Beijing’s credit.

China’s own financial vulnerabilities are deepening. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the country’s total social financing reached 309% of GDP in the first half of this year, a 6-point jump in just six months. The IMF noted that over half of the global debt-to-GDP increase since 2008 originated from China. Meanwhile, Beijing’s strategic alliances are weakening: Russia, a key BRI partner, has seen its national capacity eroded by the prolonged war in Ukraine. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently acknowledged that “a Russian defeat would shift America’s strategic focus directly onto China,” underscoring Beijing’s growing diplomatic and security dilemma.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/45401479

Archived

[...]

Deflation signals a lopsided economy where supply dwarfs demand. That hurts companies, which in turn hurts workers. As consumption weakens, businesses spend less, economic activity slows, debt burdens rise, which then causes more deflation. The downward loop, known in economics as a deflationary spiral, feeds on itself once entrenched.

The trend also carries global implications: cheap Chinese exports can depress prices abroad, strain relations with trading partners, and create knock-on effects for multinational companies. Global institutions are sounding the alarm, with the International Monetary Fund projecting that consumer inflation in China will average zero this year — the second-lowest of nearly 200 economies it tracks. The Bank of Korea warned in July that China could export deflation to its trading partners.

[...]

And the problem could be even worse than they realize. China’s official CPI figure — which offers limited item-level detail and is shaped by a complex methodology that isn’t transparent — has hovered around zero since early 2023, occasionally posting modest gains. Bloomberg News analyzed prices for dozens of products in 36 major cities as well as both official and private data across China to get a sense of how much cheaper things have become on the ground. We looked at items in categories like food, groceries, consumer goods and services, as well as housing costs and price changes for specific car brands.

[...]

Across the market, company results show the same pressures: the share of “zombie” firms — those whose profits can’t cover interest payments on their debt — rose from 19% to 34% over the past five years; capital and R&D spending fell for most companies, a first in a decade; and more than a third of companies across industries cut jobs in 2024.

[...]

Last year, salaries at private companies — which employ over 80% of China’s urban workforce — grew at the slowest pace on record. In industries like manufacturing and IT, wages fell for the first time in official statistics for private firms. A private survey on salaries, before being discontinued last year, showed average pay offers in 38 cities dropped 5% between 2022 and 2024. Even in China’s prized “new economy” sectors like AI and new energy, entry-level salaries are down 7% from their 2022 peak.

Meanwhile, households have boosted their savings to the equivalent of around 110% of China’s gross domestic product last year, the highest ever, indicating consumers are expecting lower prices in the future and heightened economic uncertainty.

[...]

There is no suggestion that the situation in China will be reversed. Despite slight seasonal upticks on holiday spending, persistent weakness across both the industrial and consumer sectors indicates China’s prices are on track for a third consecutive year of deflation in 2025. And that matters: the longer prices sag, the greater the risk that growth in the world’s second-largest economy could slow for years — even decades.

Prolonged deflation would also be virtually unprecedented for a major economy since World War II, with the lone exception of Japan, which just this year escaped its own painful battle of over a decade of weak prices and deflation. It’ll also become harder for China to climb into high-income status sustainably, or to surpass the US in economic size. Years of rising incomes and property gains had fueled dreams of upward mobility, but now deflation is quietly hollowing out the confidence of China’s once-aspiring middle class.

[...]

For Zhu, the economics professor at CEIBS, there is little time to waste for China to get itself out of this deflationary spiral. The government must pour more money into encouraging consumption — to the tune of half a trillion dollars — via unlimited vouchers for households to drive spending. If not, China’s economy is in dangerous trouble, he said.

“Historically, deflation is extremely rare,” said Zhu. “If prices are down for three years and inflation doesn’t come back, then people will believe it won’t come back. And that’s when China becomes Japan.”

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44896836

Archived

The Russian Central Bank has cut the key interest rate again from 17% to 16.5%, as most experts had predicted. The cut is symbolic: the Central Bank itself doesn’t even hide that it was forced into it. The main question now is whether this is a one-off concession or the regulator finally caved in to government pressure.

For now, it looks more like the first option. But the second cannot be ruled out.

[...]

The Central Bank’s chair, Elvira Nabiullina, said that the board discussed three options: keep it at 17%, cut it by half a percentage point to 16.5%, or cut it by a whole point to 16%. But Nabiullina’s remarks were as contradictory as the press release:

“The situation is developing overall within the bounds of our forecast. Monetary and credit conditions remain tight, which creates prerequisites for lowering inflation. Therefore, we decided to continue easing the policy. At the same time, since the last meeting, substantial inflation risks have materialized.”

Put simply, the Central Bank expected that inflation would resume its rise after the usual seasonal drop in August–September, understood that only tight monetary policy prevents it from running wild, and therefore is easing policy in light of new inflation risks. And Nabiullina, without batting an eye, lists these risks: a widening budget deficit, rising fuel prices, higher taxes.

And she is absolutely right. Moreover, none of these risks can be considered short-lived; there is no understanding of when these risks will not only disappear but also diminish.

[...]

You can’t explain the contradiction between the Central Bank’s words and actions with economic factors. But you can easily explain it politically. The draft federal budget for 2026 and for 2027-2028 clearly shows that revenues have no chance of matching expenditures. Expenditures have been cut to the minimum — the barest social spending so people won’t revolt, investments delayed or reduced. It’s all war, all hardcore — there’s no time for indulgence now.

[...]

As a side note: Russian Central Banker Elvira Nabiullina wanted to resign in early 2022 over Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but Putin rejected Nabiullina’s bid.

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44894752

Archived

China’s multi-year property crisis is set to drag on in 2026 and further weigh on banks’ asset quality, even after the government stepped up its stimulus push to boost demand, according to Fitch Ratings.

The country’s new home sales by area may decline 15 to 20 per cent from their current level before the sector stabilises, Lulu Shi, a director at Fitch, said at a briefing in Shanghai on Wednesday (Oct 29). Transactions by value may drop another 7 to 10 per cent next year, she added.

“China’s trickling stimulus measures did not pull the residential sector from a further slowdown,” Shi said. “A meaningful property recovery will only come after the job market stabilises and household income rebounds, which would require a basket of policies and a long period of time.”

[...]

The dim outlook for the domestic home market also means banks’ bad debt in the property segment will likely remain “elevated” next year, Vivian Xue, director for financial institutions at Fitch, said at the same briefing. That, coupled with households’ weakened ability to repay mortgages and other personal loans, means that banks’ asset quality could deteriorate next year, she added.

[...]

Fixed income-specialist Pimco has identified new risks to China’s growth strategy.

In response to China’s aggressive price discounting, many Emerging Markets economies have erected higher tariff and trade barriers on Chinese goods imports, it writes in a report.

Europe has initiated investigations into Chinese product dumping and may increase the use of quotas. The U.S. has raised tariffs on all trading partners, but especially on Chinese goods, which has limited the ability of Chinese producers to access the U.S. market at lower tariff rates through “connector” countries for final stages of production. Although markets have shown signs of optimism for U.S.–China trade negotiations ahead of the countries’ presidents meeting this week, the relationship between these two major economies will likely remain volatile.

[...]

Looking ahead, inventories can’t keep piling up forever if China wants to counter deflationary trends and maintain a stable economy. China’s policymakers have recently emphasized an “anti-involution” campaign: a nuanced approach to counter the intense competition that shrunk profit margins and to emphasize higher-quality growth and greater profitability, with a goal of reducing deflationary pressures.

However, unless Chinese policymakers are willing to more forcefully stimulate domestic demand, or tolerate slower production growth, Chinese products would need to continue to be exported at further price discounts to clear the inventory levels, Pimco says.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/44824942

Archived

Foreign investors who once saw China’s booming property market as a sure bet are now facing some of their biggest losses in decades. What was once a $140 billion push into Chinese real estate has turned into a wave of distressed sales and write-downs, with global players scrambling to offload assets at steep discounts.

[...]

Their retreat is adding fresh pressure to China’s already struggling property market, a sector that plays a huge role in the country’s economy.

[...]

Distressed sales — where owners sell under pressure from debt or defaults — hit 114 billion yuan (S$20.78billion) across 2023 and 2024, a record 22% of all transactions, Bloomberg Intelligence data shows.

[...]

All Sectors, One Struggle

The downturn is hitting nearly every corner of the commercial property market.

In logistics, once considered a bright spot thanks to the e-commerce boom, supply has outpaced demand. Even giants like Blackstone have started to sell. Earlier this year, it sold three logistics parks in southern China to a local insurance company for about 2.7 billion yuan.

[...]

Even distressed-debt specialists like Oaktree Capital have had difficulty turning a profit.

In 2021, Oaktree seized control of Evergrande Venice on the Sea, a sprawling resort development in Jiangsu province, after the troubled developer defaulted on a $400 million loan. The project — envisioned as a Chinese version of Venice — included canals, a grand hotel, and a conference center modeled after the U.S. Capitol.

Oaktree has since restarted construction and handed over some homes to buyers, but sales remain sluggish. Apartments that once fetched up to 10,000 yuan per square meter in 2019 are now advertised at less than half that price.

The pain may not be over. Analysts warn that it could take years for the oversupply of commercial buildings to be absorbed. Rents in China’s office market fell nearly 7% in 2024 — the sharpest drop on record — and CBRE expects no meaningful recovery in new supply until at least 2028.

[...]

“Global institutions are increasingly taking the view that this market won’t recover soon,” said Wilson. He expects office rents to keep falling through next year, and predicts that the nominal value of buildings in 2030 will still be below 2020 levels.

[...]

Here is the study: HOW CHINA COLLATERALIZES (pdf)

The How China Collateralizes (HCC) report ... is the first comprehensive analysis of the secured lending practices of Chinese creditors in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). The investigation draws upon in-depth case studies and a new dataset of collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loans from Chinese state-owned institutions to EMDEs. In total, the dataset captures 620 collateralized PPG debt transactions worth $418 billion in constant 2021 USD over a 22-year period. The report and the dataset are available for download.

Today, in conjunction with the release of How China Collateralizes, AidData has published a large cache of debt contracts—including loan, escrow account, mortgage, and debt restructuring agreements—between Chinese creditors and their overseas borrowers. In total, it has published 371 contracts between 19 Chinese creditors and 155 borrowers from 60 countries in an online repository. Digitized copies of the contracts can be accessed and searched by lender, borrower, sector, and contract clause at http://china-contracts.aiddata.org/.

...

It took the team of researchers nearly four years to make sense of the opaque and complex borrowing arrangements that are documented in the report. The obstacles that they faced were formidable. Despite recent advances in debt data sharing, few bilateral or commercial creditors publish their secured lending terms. Many seek confidentiality commitments from their borrowers, impeding disclosure. Chinese creditors are no exception. They do not publish detailed or comprehensive data about their collateralized PPG loan agreements with EMDE borrowers. Their security and escrow account agreements are even harder to obtain. Quasi-collateral structures present an additional challenge: revenue routing and restricted accounts are substantially easier to shield from public scrutiny than liens over physical assets. The same structures can also undermine fiscal autonomy, debt and revenue accountability, and macroeconomic surveillance.

...

The authors of the report made a number of unexpected findings.

“We were surprised to find that almost half of China’s PPG lending portfolio, or nearly $420 billion across 57 countries, is effectively collateralized—mostly with deposits in bank accounts abroad,” said Christoph Trebesch of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. “As security, Chinese lenders strongly prefer liquid assets—in particular, cash deposits in bank accounts located in China. They also want visibility and control over revenue streams.”

...

Foreign currency revenues deposited in bank accounts controlled by Chinese lenders secure approximately 80% of the collateralized lending volume in the new dataset. A typical security package supporting a Chinese PPG loan includes one or more restricted (escrow) accounts at banks located in China, funded by revenues from the borrowing country, bolstered by contract and property rights in the cash flows. In many cases, the deposit account is at the creditor bank, which gives them a high level of control over some of the borrower’s core revenue streams, as well as set-off rights under Chinese law.

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The research team also found that collateral is often unrelated to the stated purpose of the loan. “We see Chinese lenders expanding and adapting standard market tools to make exceptionally risky loans safer,” said Anna Gelpern, a Georgetown Law Professor and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “Instead of relying on infrastructure project assets and future revenues, which may never materialize, they seek access to established export proceeds. Exporters commit to route these proceeds through offshore bank accounts over the life of the loan, which gives creditors leverage in the relationship as well as a source of repayment.” The report notes that the World Bank and the IMF have recently raised concerns about “collateralization involving unrelated assets or revenues” and warned that it is “likely to create problems.”

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According to the authors, commodity revenue sources vary by borrowing country, but typically draw on that country’s leading commodity export: oil in Angola, Iraq, Russia, Sudan, South Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, Brazil, and Venezuela; gas in Indonesia, Myanmar, and Turkmenistan; gold in Kazakhstan; copper and cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; bauxite in Guinea; platinum and tobacco in Zimbabwe; cocoa in Ghana; and sesame in Ethiopia. Oil proceeds dominate, accounting for 79% of the commodity-backed lending volume in the dataset.

“Our research reveals a previously undocumented pattern of revenue ring-fencing, where a significant share of commodity export receipts never reaches the exporting countries,” said Brad Parks, Executive Director of William & Mary’s AidData research lab. “When the revenues from a country’s principal source of foreign currency secure its debts to a single creditor, unsecured creditors are effectively subordinated and the risk of a destructive collateral ‘arms race’ increases.”

...

The new study also reveals previously unknown details about collateralization mechanisms in China’s PPG lending portfolio in the developing world. Chinese creditors are far more likely to obtain de facto control over revenue streams and cash holdings (“quasi-collateral”) than formal security interests (liens, pledges, charges, or assignments) in the assets. Quasi-collateral can have the same economic effect as a formal security interest, but it comes with few or no public notice requirements for debtors or creditors.

Over time, the sums that accumulate in offshore accounts to secure public infrastructure debts can be very large, up to billions of US dollars. Political oversight institutions in borrowing countries—such as supreme audit institutions and public accounts committees within parliamentary bodies—have found it difficult to monitor encumbered revenue streams and cash holdings in China.

The implications for EMDEs are far-reaching. “These transactions put those tasked with fiscal governance and debt crisis management in borrower countries in difficult situations,” said Paulina Kintzinger of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. “Secrecy makes it more difficult to untangle creditor claims in times of distress and default, and can undermine both fiscal autonomy and macroeconomic surveillance.”

...

Chinese lenders also use cash collateral pools that simultaneously secure multiple debts, creating a web of interconnected transactions and risk transmission pathways. A default on any one of these debts can trigger creditor enforcement against the shared collateral, irrespective of the payment status of other obligations, and reverberate across the government’s debt stock and beyond.

For nearly half of China’s collateralized PPG loans in EMDEs, the same asset or pool of assets secures more than one loan. The transaction structure fuses elements of pre-export finance, traditionally used to support commodity exporters, with public infrastructure finance. In the combined structure a pool of established export revenues serves as collateral to de-risk multiple unrelated domestic projects in developing countries.

According to Omar Haddad of Oxford University, “China Eximbank developed a replicable and scalable cross-collateralization structure in Angola. That model was subsequently refined and adapted by a diverse group of Chinese creditors in a wide array of PPG lending operations in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Central Asia.”

...

Archived

A recent global survey by UNEP FI and Global Credit Data found that only 18 per cent of banks integrate climate risk into their internal ratings-based models [IRBs], which drive regulatory capital requirements. The study cites data gaps and methodological hurdles but does not explain the deeper problem: credit risk and climate risk models are built on fundamentally different logics.

[...]

Unless supervisors adapt, the IRB models of today will remain blind to one of the most significant credit risk drivers of this century.

Credit risk models are precision tools honed on the past. Under the IRB approach, they calculate probabilities of default, losses given default, and exposure at default using deep pools of historical data.

Defaults, losses and macroeconomic patterns from years gone by are fed into these systems, with the underlying belief that yesterday’s relationships will largely hold tomorrow. This backward-looking design is reinforced by strict regulatory requirements: every risk driver must be de facto statistically significant, rigorously validated, and continuously monitored.

The result is a disciplined, data-heavy framework built to forecast the next 12 months of creditworthiness — and nothing beyond.

Climate risk models speak a different language. They are not grounded in borrower default histories but in climate science and policy pathways. Instead of asking “what happened last year, and will it repeat?”, they ask “what could happen in the decades ahead and how prepared are we if it does?” — on the premise that past performance is no guarantee of future results.

"“A factory in a flood zone may operate for years without incident, then suffer catastrophic losses from a single storm wiping it out overnight.”"

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/40704568

Hong Kong’s debt-laden developers and their creditors are set to face intensifying financial pressure as bond maturities are slated to jump by nearly 70 per cent next year amid falling sales and valuations for the city’s economically crucial property sector.

[...]

Property and its related sectors account for roughly a quarter of Hong Kong’s GDP, and the industry’s rising non-repayments will not only weigh on its economic prospects but also cast a cloud over creditors, including HSBC, with sizeable exposure to developers in the Asian financial hub.

Local property developers’ bond maturities will climb to US$7.1 billion in 2026 from US$4.2 billion this year, according to LSEG data and Reuters calculations.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/40266243

Archived

Nearly 20% of Russian property developers are at risk of bankruptcy due to plunging sales driven by high mortgage interest rates, Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin said.

Khusnullin, who oversees housing and infrastructure in the government, warned that this figure could rise above 30% if financial conditions do not improve in the next six months.

“By my estimate, about 20% of developers face serious risks,” he told the Vedomosti business daily.

Although every fifth construction company has already delayed project completion by six months or more, he said, this is not a surefire sign that they will go bankrupt.

“But if the [Central Bank's] high key rate continues, if money doesn’t flow into the sector, if citizens stop investing in real estate and if there’s no mortgage support, the share could exceed 30%,” he said.

Khusnullin added that conventional housing loans have “almost ceased to exist as a class” since the end of a broad state-subsidized program in July 2024.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/39558695

Archived

[...]

Vladimir Gutenev, head of the State Duma’s Industry and Trade Committee, told the pro-Kremlin news outlet Life that Russians should be ready for “regular and necessary” internet shutdowns and recommended withdrawing cash in advance to avoid being caught off guard.

[...]

He acknowledged the country’s reliance on digital payment systems but emphasized the need to prioritize national security over convenience.

“We’re used to paying with cards or smartphones and having constant connectivity. But now it’s important to accept temporary restrictions as a necessity,” he said.

“Don’t turn into a hipster who only lives in the center of Moscow,” he added. “Life is not limited to comfort.”

His comments follow a sharp rise in internet outages across Russia due to the threat of Ukrainian drone attacks in recent months.

[...]

Meanwhile, Several of Russia’s largest banks are reporting an outflow of individual deposits following reductions in interest rates and widespread rumors concerning potential deposit freezes by the government.

According to data analyzed by the consultancy Frank RG, eight of the country’s 20 largest credit institutions experienced deposit outflows in June.

The largest withdrawal was recorded at Alfa-Bank, Russia’s biggest private lender with roughly 30 million clients, which saw a 3.9% decline in retail deposits equivalent to 125.3 billion rubles ($1.54 billion, according to spot foreign exchange market data published by Reuters).

Other banks posting significant outflows include the privately owned Sovcombank (-2.9%), Dom.RF (-2.5%), Russian Standard Bank (-2.2%), MKB (-2%) and both GPB and Post Bank (-1.1%) [...]

Andrei Zubets, director of the Institute for Socio-Economic Studies at the Financial University under the Russian government, said last year that authorities might implement deposit freezes in response to the threat of rapid inflation should consumers begin spending en masse.

[...]

cross-posted from: https://crazypeople.online/post/5464740

FATCA specifically oppresses Americans who live outside the US. It strong-arms banks into treating Americans adversely different based on their national origin (ranging from denial of service to extra data collection and disclosure). I thought Americans were the only people who broadly face discrimination in banking due to their nationality. But I recently heard of other nationalities (not Americans) who are refused bank access due to their nationality (in Europe, where we might have a high expectation of human rights).

I could never get the details. People that report this to me have been vague. But I’ve heard it twice now. Does anyone know the specifics? Which nationalities and why?

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/38675590

I unwittingly had shares in a company that made fentanyl before the crisis hit. I had the shares for something else they produced; didn’t know the company made fentanyl. The CEO and top managers were arrested and convicted because of some perversely unlawful activity. The stock became worthless and I was severely burnt. It felt a bit off that the millionaires at the top apparently got to keep their own money as they went to prison. They were naturally shielded from the company structure. My stock was worth zero and I recovered nothing from the bankruptcy. Lost every penny.

I thought perhaps fair enough. The risk was mine as a shareholder. Risk is what we sign up for when playing in the stock market.

Yet Facebook shareholders are suing Zuck personally on the basis of a civil offense, not criminal, for deliberately violating the privacy policy? FB is nowhere near bankrupt. Did it even take a notable long-term hit from the Cambridge Analytica scandal?

From a utilitarian standpoint, FB shareholders are scum for supporting that shitty company (neglecting holders of mutual funds and other managed funds where they lack awareness and control). OTOH, Zuck himself is the biggest piece of shit. It’s bad-on-bad, and Zuck losing his ass is justice.

But then I have to wonder, if Zuck loses the corporate shield that protects his personal money over a violating a contract, why do shareholders of a drug company not get the same privilege when it acts criminally?

I’m trapped with a shitty bank and won’t go into the reasons here.

This is what happened: I called to pay the bill. The idiot at the bank gave a pay-off quote that included interest charges of less than $2, even though the bill was not due yet. There should be no interest in this case. He would not listen. So I’m like, fuck it, I’ll pay what he quotes and then dispute the interest charge when it comes.

The billing system did the right thing.. did not charge interest. So of course I ended up with a tiny credit <$2. The asshole bank could not just let that small credit sit because there is a business advantage if they zero out all positive balances to increase the chances of a negative the next month. So they mailed a paper check for the credit.

It’s not worth my time and effort to cash a check so small. But I’ll also be damned if I let that be a donation to the bank. So I just sat on the check until it became stale and worthless. The check is bad, but the bank still owes me the money. So then I call the bank to say: hey, don’t bother sending another check, just credit my account with that amount, toward by current balance. The banker refused. In fact, the banker tried to say the money was gone -- that I lose it because it’s my fault the check is bad. I know that’s not how it works. The check goes bad but the debt does not. The bank still owes me the money. Customer service genuinely seemed clueless about that.

I spent 90 minutes on the phone arguing over this. Customer rep had to repeatedly check with management. In the end, the bank still refused to credit the account but they agreed to send another check. WTF. I guess I will just repeat the pattern until they learn.

Customer service is not cheap. Someone once told me what the bank pays per minute on phone support. I don’t recall what the figure was but it was shockingly high. I wonder how much this tiny check will cost the bank as it sits in limbo and causes repeat customer service calls, in a loop.

🏦: do you recognize a charge of zero? It was flagged as suspicious.

👱: maybe? My card was refused at some ATMs.. maybe one of them created a zero value transaction for some reason?

🏦: the charge for zero follows a charge for $7xxx.xx.

👱: WTF?! I don’t care about the charge for zero. Tell me more about the 4-figure charge plz.

🏦: yeah, there was a charge for $7xxx.xx. Do you not recognize that?

👱: hell no I do not. Are you really sure there is a transaction of that magnitude? And why are you questioning me over the charge for zero when there is a crazy charge right next to it?

(lot of back and forth.. me asking if she was sure.. I could hardly believe what I was hearing)

🏦: since you do not recognize the transaction for $7xxx.xx, I am deactivating your card. You will get a new one.

Fuck me. I am traveling abroad and this will fuck my shit up. Then I realized after the call that the transaction amount is very close to my remaining credit. I thought surely that banker must have been misreading her screen. Called back.

🏦(Next banker): indeed there was never a transaction for $7xxx.xx. That was the value of a balance inquiry, not a transaction.

👱: ok, so you have a colleague who is struggling to understand the infosystem. Please re-activate my card.

🏦: we’re unable to do that. Yes, it’s clear the first banker you spoke to made a mistake. But the card cannot be reactivated. Sorry...

WTF. I did not even do a balance inquiry. It must have been something the ATM did on its own just to know what withdrawal amounts to offer. So then I asked why was the txn refused? Banker: we have an ATM limit of $xxx. (This figure changes with every banker I talk to. Apparently the limit is lower than what the ATM offered in the preset amounts).

Is this a software defect? If the ATM wants to know what amounts to offer me for withdrawal, then querying the bank for the balance is wrong. It should really be querying the bank for the cash withdrawal limit/availability, which is not the same as the balance or available credit.

According to BBC World News, the stocks in the US that are expected to do well under Trump are surging. I think those stocks are surely over-valued. Their value will be corrected after Trump loses.

~~In the US it’s illegal to bet on elections~~(see update), but betting on the stock market is fair game. I would love it if the some short-sellers would exploit this situation.

(update) It’s now legal to bet on elections in the US, as of a few weeks ago

I hope this question doesn’t piss anyone off.. it was censored on lemmy.ml.

I’m looking for 3rd-party banks that issue debit cards for use on the Discover / Diner’s Club network. It’s quite rare. Visa, Mastercard, and AmEx are more common and easier to find, but I have a number of objections to those companies. Discover is a clear lesser of evils. This is what I know from past and present searches:

• (FL) https://cadencebank.com/ ← Cloudflare, not interested
• (GA) colony.bank ← dead (or blocks Tor)
• (IL) https://www.oldsecond.com/ ← used to have a Discover debit card but no longer. Rumored to have a Discover credit card but I don’t see mention of it on their website
• (KY) cfsbky.com ← Cloudflare, not interested
• (MD) https://www.oldlinebank.com/ ← dead (or blocks Tor)
• (PA) jbt.bank ← Sucuri, not interested
• (TX) thebankandtrust.com ← Cloudflare, not interested
• (TX) www.extracobanks.com ← blocks Tor
• (WI) https://www.guardiancu.org/ ← dead (or blocks Tor)

If I overlooked any please mention it (even if it’s Cloudflare, just to know the options). It’s a paltry list considering there are thousands of banks and credit unions nationwide.. and I only found 9.

True Value hardware used to have a Discover credit card but discontinued that in 2020.

There’s some chatter that Capital One may acquire Discovercard. It will be a shame if that happens, but the upside could be that more 3rd-party Discovercards emerge from it.